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Scenario Analysis for ACOs & Antitrust. 
Christopher Bays 
Health Care Finance 
May 7, 2012 
I. Intro 
 
The problem the United States health care industry faces today is one of 
fragmentation.  The Institute of Medicine has pointed out that this problem, specifically, is 
jeopardizing the lives and well-being of many Americans as well as contributing to the 
excessive level and unsustainable growth rate of expenditures on health care.  
1
 
Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) are designed to promote care coordination, 
higher quality, and lower costs.
2
  ACOs are groups of doctors, hospitals, and other health 
care providers who come together voluntarily as a group to give coordinated high quality 
care to their Medicare patients.
3
 The goal of coordinated care is to ensure that patients, 
                                                          
1 Harvard Law School, Center for Health Law Policy, Biotechnology and Bioethics, Our Fragmented Health Care 
System: Causes and Solutions (Jun. 13-14, 2008)  http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/petrie-
flom/workshops_conferences/Conferences/Fragmentation/ProgramMay29.pdf; also see Auerbach DI and 
Kellermann AL, A Decade of Health Care Cost Growth Has Wiped Out Real Income Gains 
for an Average U.S. Family, Health Affairs, Vol. 30, No. 9, September 2011 (In the ten-year period between 
1999 and 2009, U.S. health care spending nearly doubled, climbing from $1.3 trillion to $2.5 trillion. In 
2009, while the rest of the U.S. economy plunged into recession and millions lost their jobs, health care 
costs grew by 4 percent. As a result, the percentage of our nation’s gross domestic product (GDP) devoted 
to health care reached 17.6 percent, up from 13.8 percent only ten years earlier. Although these numbers 
are striking, they do not easily translate into figures that are meaningful to individual Americans.) 
2
 Maulik Joshi, American Hospital Association, Accountable Care Organizations AHA Research Synthesis 
Report, American Hospital Association Committee on Research, (June 10) available at 
http://www.hret.org/accountable/resources/ACO-Synthesis-Report.pdf  
3
 See Id.; Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services: Accountable Care Organizations (Last modified 04/05/2012) 
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Fee-for-Service-Payment/ACO/index.html?redirect=/ACO/ (The ACO 
concept envisions multiple providers assuming joint accountability for improving health care quality and slowing 
the growth of health care costs. The concept was also included in national health care reform legislation as one of 
several demonstration programs to be administered by Medicare (Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 2010). 
However, ACOs described in health reform legislation are operationally different from other ACO models. The role 
of ACOs in integrating and aligning provider incentives in care delivery requires participating organizations to 
possess certain key competencies.) 
2 
 
especially the chronically ill, get the appropriate care while avoiding unnecessary 
duplication of services and preventing medical errors.  This is a shift from the old health 
care model, fee for service, which took into account the value or volume of referrals 
generated between the parties
4
, towards a joint cooperation model amongst providers.  As 
long as the group meets defined quality benchmarks, its providers can share in any 
financial rewards that result from cost savings.  Most importantly, the providers also share 
in the collective risk of penalties for poor performance and therefore have an incentive to 
control the quality of care that could help shape health care delivery costs. In order for the 
ACO model to flourish, waivers must be put in place.  One of the major restraints with the 
old model of clinical integration was the tendency to fall into the trap of either over-
utilization, under-utilization (i.e., the withholding of necessary items or services), or 
referrals that are based on considerations other than what might be in the best interest of 
the patient.
5
 ACOs provide potential solutions to fragmentation. ACOs are intended to 
achieve greater coordination of care by linking together physician practices and hospitals 
that will be financially rewarded if they improve quality while at the same time lowering 
costs. Recent trends show an increase in health care marketplace consolidation.
6
   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
 
4
 Claire Turcotte and Bryn Hunt, OIG Issues One Negative and One Favorable Advisory Opinion on Hospital-Based 
Arrangements, Bricker and Eckler Publications (Novemeber 29, 2010) available at  
http://www.bricker.com/publications-and-resources/publications-and-resources-details.aspx?publicationid=2069  
5
 American Medical Association, Trend watch: Clinical Integration—Key to Real Reform, 10 (February,2010) 
available at http://www.aha.org/research/reports/tw/10feb-clinicinteg.pdf  As apply to Medicare and Medicaid 
patients there is an aimed at curbing arrangements that involve financial incentives to providers that could result in 
either over-utilization, under-utilization (i.e., the withholding of necessary items or services), or referrals  that are 
based on considerations other than what might be in the best interest of the patient. While well intended, statutes are 
either broadly written or interpreted so as to also prohibit – or create uncertainties about – a broad range of benign 
arrangements that could better align hospitals and physicians and pose little or no potential risk of abuse. 
6
 America’s Health Insurance Plan Coverage, Fact Check: Provider Consolidation Drives Up Prices (February 17, 
2012), http://www.ahipcoverage.com/2012/02/17/fact-check-provider-consolidation-drives-up-prices/ An analysis of 
3 
 
When insurers, hospitals and physician practices consolidate,  however, anti-
competitive arrangements result, leading to a decrease in cost control measures.  These 
outcomes have potential to violate federal laws established in the Sherman Act, Clayton act 
and Federal Trade Commission Act.
7
  Despite the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and 
Department of Justice (DOJ) developing safe harbors in order to provide clearance for 
providers to collaborate without running afoul of federal anti-trust laws, the proposed anti-
trust enforcement declined to address state anti-trust concerns. 
This paper will specifically deal with the issues concerning ACOs role in antitrust 
violations and will present the argument that while federal safe harbors alone may initially 
prove to be sufficient protection at the inception of ACOs, their longevity at effectiveness 
is uncertain.  The lack of preemption within Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA), provides state antitrust enforcement the power to ensure the greatest level of 
protection.  Part II will explain the problem of fragmentation; describe the formation, 
requirements, and objectives of ACOs.   This section will also provide a scenario analysis 
of most ideal illustration of clinical integration. Part III will focus how integration of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
provider consolidation found that “in 2009, hospital ownership was ‘highly concentrated’ in over 80% of the 335” 
areas studied.  Also See Cory Capps ,PhD and David Dranove, PhD, Market Concentration of Hospitals, (June 
2011) available at http://www.ahipcoverage.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/ACOs-Cory-Capps-Hospital-Market-
Consolidation-Final.pdf  
7
 Caswell O. Hobbs, FTC Enforcement: Antitrust Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices, Corporate Law and 
Practice Handbook Series, 524 PLI/Corp 437, PLI Order No. B4-6755 (May 1, 1986) (Sherman Act prohibits 
contracts, combinations and conspiracies which unreasonably restrain competition. Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18, 
prohibits mergers and acquisitions which may lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly. Clayton Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 18(a), known as the “Hart-Scott-Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976,” requires parties to certain 
mergers, acquisitions, joint ventures and corporate and non-corporate formations to notify the FTC and DOJ about 
the transaction before the transaction closes. FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45, prohibits unfair methods of competition. The 
FTC Act can also be used to challenge merger which are not technically covered under Section 7 of the Clayton Act. 
See FTC v. Brown Shoe Co., 384 U.S. 316, 321 (1966). Only the FTC has jurisdiction to sue under the FTC Act. 
 
4 
 
providers could lead to arrangements that are centered around price fixing and joint 
negotiations.  In addition, the worst case scenario is discussed and the viability of such a 
scenario to come to fruition.  Part IV will show how Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and Health and Human Services (HHS) plan to provide 
antitrust clearance to protect ACOs against any federal suits under existing antitrust laws.  
These exceptions will be made to those ACOs that are productive, competitive and have 
become fully integrated while operating in the commercial market.  Part V examines the 
dynamic scenario, looking forward to the years following the initial implementation of 
ACOs. The theory of what might be helpful and effective at one point in time (during the 
initial phase of inception of ACOs), may not be the solution for the long term. The risk that 
federally approved ACOs can gain enormous market power despite the parameters under 
antitrust clearance can influence the overall efficiency.  Lastly, Part VI addresses the 
possibility of state and private lawsuits against dominant ACOs and explains why such 
actions provide a necessary second level of defense for patients when ACOs become 
market dominate. 
II. Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) 
A. Fragmentation 
Fragmentation comprises the core of the ineffectiveness in our increasingly frantic 
efforts to foster improvement to a health care system which has produced unsustainable 
cost increases, poor quality, and inequalities.
8
  The underlying cause in a fragmented 
system is the patients and families navigating across different providers and care settings.  
                                                          
8
 Elhauge ed., The Fragmentation in US. Health Care: Cases and Solutions , Oxford (Jan. 15, 2010) 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/elhauge/pdf/Elhauge%20The%20Fragmentation%20of%20US%20Healt
h%20Care%20--%20Introductory%20Chpt.pdf  
5 
 
This experience fosters frustrating and dangerous patient experiences due to poor 
communication and lack of clear accountability.
9
  The inadequacy of accountability has 
lead to medical errors, waste of resources, and duplication of services; ultimately high-
cost.
10
 This fragmentation is found on the national, state, community, and practice levels. 
Health spending has soared over the past decades from a National health expenditure of 
$27.1 billion in 1960 to today over $2.6 trillion.
11
  Lack of competition created 
supracompetitive profits
12
, an escalating number of uninsured, an epidemic of deceptive 
and fraudulent conduct, and rapidly escalating costs. Over 47 million Americans are now 
uninsured and premiums have risen over 120 percent in the past decade for those who do 
have coverage.
13
  Health insurers engage in an endless list of deceptive, fraudulent, and 
unfair practices that deny millions of consumers adequate coverage. Meanwhile, 10 of the 
largest health insurers saw their profits balloon from $2.4 billion in 2000 to $13 billion in 
2007.
14
   No single national entity or set of policies governs or guides the health care 
system; states divide their responsibilities among multiple agencies, while providers 
practicing in the same community and caring for the same patients often work 
                                                          
9
 Ani B. Satz, Overcoming Fragmentation in Disability and Health Law, 60 Emory L.J. 277 
10
 Randall D. Cebul, James B. Rebitzer, Lowell J. Taylor, and Mark Votruba, “Organizational 
Fragmentation and Care Quality in the U.S. Health Care System” NBER Working Paper No. 14212 (August 
2008) JEL No. D2,I11,I12,I18,IO 
11
 Julie Barnes, The Many Legal Barriers Standing in the way  of Health Care Reform, The Atlantic (March 
15, 2012, 9:02 AM ET), reprinted in Bipartisan Policy  (Posted March 16, 2012) 
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/the-many-legal-barriers-standing-in-the-way-of-health-
care-reform/254259/  
12
 David Balto, Make the Market Work for Health Care, Center for American Progress (February 9, 2010) 
available at http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2010/02/market_health_care.html  (Supracompetitive 
pricing is pricing above what can be sustained in a competitive market . This may be indicative of a business 
that has a unique legal or competitive advantage, or possibly of anti -competitive behavior that has driven 
competition from the market.) 
13
 Health Care for America Now, Premiums Soaring in Consolidated Health Insurance Market: Lack of 
Competition Hurts Rural States, Small Businesses (2009) available at 
http://hcfan.3cdn.net/dadd15782e627e5b75_g9m6isltl.pdf.  
14
 Id. at 1 
6 
 
independently from one another.
15
 Take this scenerior: A patient tells one nurse she is 
allergic to some medicine but the nurse does not communicate this information . The nurse 
on the next shift then administers that medicine.
16
  This example exemplifies the problems 
of fragmentation.  A broader conception and more of a macro approach to fragmentation 
focuses on lack of coordination between different providers that a patient might see for 
different illnesses. This might occur if, say, a surgeon used a high-sugar intravenous 
therapy after an operation on a diabetic patient without consulting with the diabetic 
specialist treating the patient.
17
  Fee for service encourages care fragmentation, poor 
coordination across different provider settings, and in some instances, unnecessary care 
that exposes patients to risk without providing any value to health.
18
 Today, chronic disease 
accounts for about 75 percent of total health care spending. An acute disease-focused, per-
intervention model of care delivery and payment cannot address America's current needs.
19
 
These fragmented organizational structures have led to disrupted relationships, poor 
information flows, and misaligned incentives that combine to degrade care  quality and 
increase costs.
20
  
Providers can improve the method in which they deliver care simply by 
increasing the role of information technology and the ability of information to flow 
freely across providers.  Under the provisions of the PPACA, twenty-two of the sixty-
                                                          
15
 A. Shih, K. Davis, S. Schoenbaum, A. Gauthier, R. Nuzum, and D. McCarthy, Organizing the U.S. 
Health Care Delivery System for High Performance, The Commonwealth Fund, August 2008.  
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/Publications/Fund-Reports/2008/Aug/Organizing-the-U-S--Health-Care-
Delivery-System-for-High-Performance.aspx  
16
 Elhauge ed., The Fragmentation in US. Health Care: Cases and Solutions, supra note 8, at 3 
17
 EIner Id. at 3. 
18
 Barnes, The Many Legal Barriers Standing in the way  of Health Care Reform, supra note 11, at 3  
19
 Id. at 3 
20
 Id. at 3 
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five quality measures pertain to “meaningful use” of information technology. 21 This 
will not only allow providers to work together, but also allow ACOs to meet additional 
quality measures which maybe result in larger shared savings.  This entails patient 
information being available to all providers at the point of care and to patients through 
electronic health record systems.
22
  Information technology pushes the health care 
model in the right direction towards implementing a clear standard of accountability for 
the total care of patients. Accessibility to information allows providers accountability to 
each other, ability to review each other's work, and collaborate to deliver reliably, high -
quality, high-value care. 
With a seamless flow of information across providers, from insurers to hospital to 
physicians, modern information technology offers many tools to facilitate coordination.
23
  
Physicians exposed to the system had reduced resource utilization and have experienced 
fewer unresolved gaps in care.
24
  Clinical integration is a way for physicians to work 
together in a team style environment and collaborate within virtual or physical wall of the 
medical center.  Previous research and experience has shown that greater care coordination 
and integration can lead to higher quality care as well as more efficient care.
25
  Clinical 
                                                          
21
 Amy K. Fehn, “The importance of Health Information Technology for Accountable Care Organization, The 
Atlantic  (June 2, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/03/the-many-legal-barriers-standing-in-
the-way-of-health-care-reform/254259/ (Last Visited 4/29/12).  
22
 A. Shih, Organizing the U.S. Health Care Delivery System for High Performance, supra  note 15 
23
 Amy K. Fehn, “The importance of Health Information Technology for Accountable Care Organization, supra 
note 21. 
24
 Chernew, Michael E., Allison B. Rosen, and Mark A. Fendrick, Value-Based Insurance Design, Health 
Affairs, 26 no. 2 (2007) , pp. 8, (published online January 30,2007), 
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/26/2/w195.full.pdf+html. 
25
 Leighton Ku, Peter Shin, Masha Regenstein and Holly Mead, “Promoting the Integration and Coordination of 
Safety-net Health Care Providers Under Health Reform: Key Issues”  The Commonwealth Fund (October 13,  2011) 
1552 Vol.22 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/Files/Publications/Issue%20Brief/2011/Oct/1552_Ku_promoting_integ
ration_safetynet_providers_under_reform_ib_v2.pdf  
8 
 
integration is also the initial platform toward implementing an ACO, the future of 
healthcare delivery in America.  On March 23, 2010, Congress passed the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)
26
, designed to integrate the model in which 
patient care is delivered in Medicare and the Medicare Shared Savings Program (MSSP) by 
using the ACO model.  The Affordable Care Act is in place to improve the quality of health 
care services and to lower healthcare costs by encouraging providers to create integrated 
health care delivery systems.   
B. ACOs 
ACOs are collaborations that integrate groups of providers formed from a variety of 
entities. These include physicians (particularly primary care physicians), individual 
physicians, hospitals, partnerships and others forms of joint-ventures.
27
  These providers 
work to manage and coordinate care for Medicare and commercial beneficiaries.  A 
common feature of successful ACOs will be its ability to connect and synchronize the 
interests of the providers, payers and patients.
28
 In doing so, these ACOs may receive 
shared-saving bonuses from a payer by achieving measured quality targets and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
The Affordable Care Act includes several provisions designed to encourage greater coordination and integration 
among health care providers, including the promotion of accountable care organizations. Such providers face 
particular challenges in coordinating care for their low-income and uninsured patients, and no single approach is 
likely to meet their diverse needs. Successful efforts will require federal, state, and local financial resources to 
sustain the safety net and make the investments needed to upgrade capabilities. In addition, they will require flexible 
strategies that can accommodate variations in community and state needs. These strategies are likely to be adopted 
by Medicare and private insurers alike. 
 
26
 H.R. 3590 (111th): Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (2009-2010); also see 
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr3590  
27
 Timony K. Lake, Kate A. Stewart and Paul B. Ginsburg, Lessons from the Field: Making ACOs Real, National 
Institute for Health Care Reform, No.2 (Jan. 2011) 
28
 Elizabeth G. Litten. “ACOs: Getting More for Less?” New Jersey Law Journal Vol. 204- No. 8 (May 23, 2011)  
available at http://www.foxrothschild.com/newspubs/newspubsArticle.aspx?id=4294967686 (last visited April 29, 
2012) 
9 
 
demonstrating real reductions in overall spending growth for a defined population of 
patients
29
   
The majority of ACO proposals assume that providers within each community will 
come together to form these integrated delivery models and solicit other providers in the 
community to voluntarily join the ACO.
30
 This focus on coordinated patient-centered care 
has led to strict requirements which an ACO must satisfy prior to (prior to what?) to be 
eligible for the benefits.  The following requirements must meet to form ACOs under the 
Medicare Shared Savings Program as well as non-Medicare ACOs: 
 Define processes to promote the practice of evidence-based medicine and provide 
data to evaluate quality and cost measures. 
 Build a management and leadership structure that includes administrative and 
clinical systems. 
 Develop a formal legal structure that allows the organization to receive payments 
and distribute shared savings among participating providers. 
 Have enough primary care providers to provide care to a minimum of 5,000 
Medicare beneficiaries. 
 Establishing, reporting, and ensuring compliance with health care quality criteria, 
including quality performance standards. 
 Contract with a core group of specialist physicians. 
 Agree to participate in the program for a minimum of three years31 
 
                                                          
29
 David Newman, “Accountable Care Organizations and the Medicare Shared Savings Program” Congressional 
Research Service (November 4, 2010), pp. 1. (Quoting Aaron McKethan, Mark McClellan, Elliott Fisher, et al., 
Moving from Volume-Driven Medicine Toward Accountable Care, Health Affairs, Health Affairs Blog, August 20, 
2009. http://www.healthaffairs.org/blog.) available at http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R41474_20101104.pdf .  
 
30
 Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services: Accountable Care Organizations, supra note 3. 
31
 Department of Health and Human Services, Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Saving Program: Accountable 
Care Organizations, Federal Register, Vol. 76, No. 67 (Thursday April 7, 2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-
2011-04-07/pdf/2011-7880.pdf  
10 
 
ACOs aim to change both the philosophy and practice patterns of providers and in 
turn, benefit all patients from the delivery of higher-quality, lower-cost, and better 
integrated services.
32
 Philosophically, the attention of the health care system changes under 
ACOs from the traditional focus on treating patients with truly urgent problems to 
preventing those conditions in the first place. On the financial side, ACOs shift away from 
paying based on the quantity of services rendered and more toward paying based on the 
quality of services.
33
  Although ACOs may contract with any payer (Medicare, Medicaid, 
or private insurer) to provide services and share in any resulting savings, the results from 
this shift are assumed to be far reaching and favorable for the health care delivery system.  
Certification of ACOs for participation in the Medicare Shared Savings Program 
(MSSP) therefore must qualify under certain performance standards set forth by the Health 
and Human Services.
34
 Experts expect MSSP will improve growth of integrated delivery 
systems, and some experts think as many as 270 ACOs will be created as a result and serve 
an estimate of 1-5 million Medicare beneficiaries.
35
  To be eligible to participate in the 
Shared Savings Program, the ACO must define, establish, implement, and periodically 
update processes to promote patient engagement. An ACO must describe in its application 
                                                          
32
 Stephen G. Pelletier, ACOs: Controlling Costs While Improving Care, Association of American Medical Colleges 
Reporter (February 2011) 
https://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/feb11/174756/controlling_costs_while_improving_care.html  
33
 Barnes, The Many Legal Barriers Standing in the way  of Health Care Reform , supra note 11, at 3. 
34
 Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice, Statement of Antitrust Enforcement Policy 
Regarding Accountable Care Organizations Participating in the Medicare Shared Saving Program, 
Federal Register, Vol. 76 No. 209 (October 28, 2011) available at 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/fedreg/2011/10/111020aco.pdf  (The final Policy Statement differs from the proposed 
Policy Statement issued Apr. 19, 2011, in two significant respects. First, the entire final Policy Statement applies to 
all providers and provider groups that are eligible to participate in the MSSP regardless if they were formed after 
March 23, 2010. Second, MSSP will no longer require a mandatory antitrust review. Nevertheless, Agencies will 
continue to protect competition in markets served by ACOs monitoring information collected by CMS concerning 
competitive effects of ACOs). 
35
 Interview by Jennifer Prestigiacomo with Richard Gilfillian, M.D., Director of the Center for Medicare and 
Medicaid Innovation at CMS, Industry Exclusive: Pioneers in Accountable Care, (January 26, 2012) available at 
http://www.healthcare-informatics.com/article/industry-exclusive-pioneers-accountable-care    
11 
 
how it intends to evaluate the health needs of the ACO's assigned population, communicate 
clinical knowledge and evidence-based medicine to beneficiaries, engage with beneficiaries 
in shared decision-making, provide written standards for beneficiary access and 
communication, and establish a process for beneficiaries to access their medical records. 
36
 
C. Best Case Scenario 
In evaluating the ACO health care model, ACOs  best case scenario guides us in 
determining the maximum potential for their success. CMS concludes ACOs would save 
Medicare about $1.9 billion between 2012-2014 and drastically improve quality and 
efficiency.
37
  A prime example of the “Best Case Scenario” consists of an ACO in a large 
urban area that is competitive with 2 or 3 other ACOs.
38
  This ensures equal 
competitiveness amongst providers, deeply integrated in information technology and has 
prominent primary physicians within its provider. Medicare recipient and commercial 
consumer alike benefit alike from this scenario.  Providers working together to manage and 
coordinate care allows consumers to take advantage of the option to select from identical 
care that is of the utmost quality.  Several supporters of ACOs point to Kaiser Permanente 
                                                          
36
 Department of Health and Human Services, Medicare Program; Medicare Shared Saving Program Accountable 
Care Organizations, Federal Register, Vol. 76 No. 212 (Wednesday, Nov. 2, 2011) available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-11-02/pdf/2011-27461.pdf (This final rule contains provisions relating to 
Medicare payments to providers of services and suppliers participating in ACOs under the Medicare Shared Savings 
Program. Providers can continue to receive traditional Medicare fee-for-service (FFS) payments and be eligible for 
additional payments if they meet specified quality requirements)    
37
 David Hogberg, Your Health care in 429 Easy-to-Read Pages!, Investors Business Daily Blog (April 1,2011, 
2:44pm), http://blogs.investors.com/capitalhill/index.php/home/35-politicsinvesting/2552-your-health-care-in-429-
easy-to-read-pages  
38
 Press Release, United States Census Bureau, Growth in Urban Pop. Outpaces Rest of Nation,(March, 26, 2012) 
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/2010_census/cb12-50.html (The nation's urban population 
increased by 12.1 percent from 2000 to 2010, outpacing the nation's overall growth rate of 9.7 percent for the same 
period, according to the U.S. Census Bureau. Urban areas — defined as densely developed residential, commercial 
and other nonresidential areas -- now account for 80.7 percent of the U.S. population, up from 79.0 percent in 2000. 
Although the rural population -- the population in any areas outside of those classified as “urban” — grew by a 
modest amount from 2000 to 2010, it continued to decline as a percentage of the national population.) 
 
12 
 
and Healthcare Partner Medical Group as notable examples of the success and potential of 
ACO type models.
39
  At Kaiser Permanente, providers have cut the number of senior visits 
by about 40 percent by delivering team care to them, and identifying all the seniors at high 
risk and making sure they get the right prescriptions, the right follow-up and the right 
coaching.
40
  This type of harmonization saves hundreds of millions of dollars a year. 
Although neither anticipates joining the MSSP, both provider groups currently have the 
level of integration and coordination that will be established by ACOs.
41
 
III. Road Block to Integration 
However, because most Medicare ACOs serve private insurers as well, provider 
dominance concerns in negotiations may raise a valid anticompetitive claim under antitrust 
law.  These anticompetitive concerns result from both horizontal and vertical integration.
42
 
Such concentration is significant because, with health insurance in the picture, consumers 
must be mindful that the expect savings from ACOs  is dependent on perfect competition. 
An organization integrates horizontally or vertically when it enters the new market as a 
competitor, and the increase market presence create the required competition.  Horizontal 
                                                          
39 James C. Robinson and Emma L. Dolan, Accountable Care Organizations in California: Lessons for the National 
Debate on Delivery System Reform, Integrated Healthcare Assc. White Paper (2010) ACOs in California care 
for 15.7 million prepaid enrollees covered by commercial HMO, Medicare, and Medicaid managed care, plus 
numerous Medicare fee-for-service enrollees. Kaiser Permanente is the most successful ACO in California.  In 
California, approximately 56% of individuals with commercial insurance, 45% of Medicare beneficiaries, and 52% 
of Medicaid beneficiaries receive their care from an ACO, collectively these account for 54% of all persons with 
health insurance in the state. California’s provider organizations span a wide spectrum of sizes and structures, from 
the fully integrated Kaiser Permanente with 6.7 million enrollees to small medical groups and IPAs, some with 
fewer than 5,000 patients.  
40
 Interview by Joanne Silberner with George Halverson, CEO, Kaiser Permanente, Head of Major HMO Sees 
Opening for ACOs,  Kaiser Health News (July 25, 2011), 
http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/July/25/halvorson-Q-and-A-kaiser-permanente-accountable-care-
organizations.aspx (last Visited 3/29/12) 
41
 Press Release, Kaiser Permanente, 2011 Aon Hewitt Value Initiative Benchmarking Study, (March 2011) 
available at  https://brokernet.kp.org/broker/wcm/connect/704ae100482fc6a681369fcc62f09f01/CO-Health-
care-reform-ACO.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&lmod=725315576 (Last Visited 3/29/12)  
42
 Anderson Foreign Motors, Inc. v. New England Toyota Distributor, Inc. 475 F.Supp. 973(D. Mass 1979) 
13 
 
integration is partnering of providers with other providers across the same or similar level 
within the healthcare field
43
, for example when a cardiologist and an urologist combine 
services to provide more uniform care. Conversely, vertical integration is the partnering of 
healthcare organizations that provide some service in the supply chain to the healthcare 
industry, for example insurance companies teaming up with hospitals and providers to 
improve quality.  Although vertical integration is not prohibited per se, vertical integration 
may be unlawful under Sherman Act if it creates monopoly power and is accompanied by 
intent to exclude competition.
44
 
Although antitrust laws permit integration, these network structures create a vehicle 
for troubling concerns.
45
  Particularly ACOs run the risk of price fixing, engaging in joint 
price negotiations, and they may be able to exercise extreme market power particularly in 
rural markets.
46
  Market power measures the degree to which an organization has the ability 
to raise prices or exclude rivals. As with other industries, the laws of market power and its 
impact on competition affect the health care system. Several studies show that prices go up 
in markets where large healthcare organizations have amassed substantial market power.
47
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This problem increases with respect to negotiations with private payers because, unlike 
Medicare sets their own rates, leaving patients powerless against joint venture providers.
48
  
Furthermore, any decline in savings from the Medicare Shared Saving Program will simply 
be passed on to the commercial payer and subsequently increase the market share and 
power of the provider.
49
   
The potential draw backs of ACOs,, the worst-case scenario, involve their potential 
to harm our nation’s healthcare industry. Critics like Tim Greaney, and even some 
supporters, concur that large amounts of collaboration produce a wave of regional 
consolidations among providers that would locate around large hospitals and become 
monopolies or duopolies that increase, rather than decrease, cost.
50
  Rural areas illustrate 
such an example, with only a single quality hospital and a large service area.  These 
providers choose the primary physicians and the clientele as well as set prices to  the level 
that benefits the ACO the most.  Instances such as this give the dominant provider 
essentially the ability to cherry pick practices and patient panels that will be able to yield 
the greatest investment in value and will receive the greatest benefit from the ACO 
arrangement.
51
  Another scenario involves the provider as simply the better organization 
and naturally forces out competitors within its service area. Federal antitrust laws, like 
Sherman Act, do not penalize efficient monopolies or natural monopolies so private 
patients and insurers might end up paying more because the new, larger organizations 
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would inhibit competition.
52
  Without other ACOs acting to force rivalries among 
providers, or between them and other networks in the market, large ACOs may entrench 
market power in any of the provider markets. If the ACO movement contributes to market 
dominance by large providers, it is counterproductive to the entire premise and any benefit 
is lost.
53
 
Empirical studies show the viability of that scenario and suggest that health care 
reform legislation has already prompted a number of mergers among health care 
providers.
54
 Furthermore, a substantial body of economic evidence indicates that market 
concentration has been a major factor spurring escalation in the cost of health insurance. 
Studies show that hospital consolidation in the 1990s raised overall inpatient prices by at 
least 5%, and by 40% or more when merging hospitals were located close to one another.
55
  
Furthermore, a study undertaken by the Massachusetts Attorney General showed delivery 
costs were driven largely by hospitals and physician groups market dominance, not by 
quality or cost of providing care.
56
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In spite of the upsides to the ACO, providers must be aware of the potential for 
antitrust litigation to slow down or even block integration in some instances.  Private suits 
are less of a concern to ACOs because individual plaintiffs have a more difficult time, at 
large, proving key elements of an antitrust violation.
57
  In order to prove an antitrust 
violation, the plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence that they suffered an injury to their 
“business or property,” actual harm or damage in fact, proximate cause and scienter. 58 The 
most difficult of the elements to prove is actual harm and scienter.
59
 For example, in April 
2010, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied class certification in an 
antitrust action against the January 2000 Evanston Northwestern Healthcare Corporation’s 
acquisition of Highland Park Hospital, ruling that the plaintiffs did not prove “common 
impact.”60 Nonetheless, ACO are susceptible to numerous amounts of frivolous lawsuits 
that could delay integration. 
On the other hand, federal investigations pressure the ACOs. Doctors, hospitals, 
insurance companies and drug manufacturers will be running huge legal risks if they get 
together and agree on a strategy that involves negotiation of prices and reduces the growth 
of health spending.
61
  Furthermore, in a recent letter to the Senate Finance Committee, the 
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American Hospital Association said uncertainty about enforcement of the antitrust laws 
“makes it difficult for a hospital and doctors to collaborate to improve care” and lower 
costs.
62
 The threat of a Federal Investigation, signifies the realization that the ACO is about 
to embark on a lengthy legal process resulting in years of legal problems.  Although not an 
analogous business, Microsoft Corporation faced identical antitrust investigations in the 
1990′s and the results were damaging for the software giant.63  A similar lengthy 
investigation could be devastating to ACO and the modernization of the health care 
delivery system in America. 
In order to sort out effectuated and continual mergers facilitated by encouragement 
of ACOs, the Center for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), working with the FTC 
(which has announced a final policy statement regulating of ACOs both within the means 
of the Shared Savings Program as well as in commercial markets), can take a number of 
steps to reduce the risk of anticompetitive effects. 
  
IV. Protection of Clinical Integration 
The Federal Trade Commission and the Antitrust Division of the Department of 
Justice (the “Agencies”) recognize that ACOs could reduce compe tition and harm 
consumers through enormous bargaining power which would result in higher prices and 
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lower quality of care.
64
  Pursuant to these concerns, the Agencies released enforcement 
policies addressing federal antitrust uncertainties and ensuring that  ACOs have an 
opportunity to achieve maximum efficiency while protecting patients from potential 
anticompetitive harm.  In order to strike a balance among the providers to encourage the 
formation of ACOs while avoiding service area dominance, the Agencies set forth safety 
zones in which providers can facilitate with little to no challenge or agency review.
65
 
Despite these concerns by the DOJ and FTC, those ACOs falling into an exemption 
or comply with the FTC guidelines avoid a mandatory review and are only subject to 
voluntary disclosure.  The significant feature of voluntary disclosure consists of 
transparency and accessibility of information regarding costs and quality to consumers and 
regulators.  This ability to monitor, share, and publicize statistical data, improves 
competition and provide clearance for ACO to operate within several of the FTC safe 
harbors.
66
   
An ACOs falls within the safety zone if the participants combine common service 
share is 30% or less within their Primary Service Area (PSA) and does not raise concerns 
of exclusivity.
67
  Because exclusivity increases the likelihood of an ACO being able to gain 
provider dominance and exercise market power, regulators must be aware of these 
characteristics when determining whether an ACO sufficiently fulfills the safe harbor 
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requirement. This safe harbor from mandatory review protects any service provided in PSA 
including physician specialties, major diagnostics, in & out patient facilities.  The PSA is a 
screening mechanism used by the FTC and DOJ which constitutes the relevant antitrust 
geographic market, with the intention to evaluate potential competitive problems within a 
region.  Joint ventures with low PSA shares reflect a low risk of an ACO being able to 
exercise market power and produce anticompetitive fears, while high PSA shares indicate a 
likelihood of an ACO having exclusivity, market power and ability to drive up prices. 
Thus, the agencies agree that ACOs with less than 30% PSA shares are unlikely to raise 
any anticompetitive concerns.
68
  
The Agencies agree that through incorporation of the final version of the Policy 
Statement, that ACOs will not be challenged if classified under a safety zone and  will, 
therefore, no longer require mandatory review, absent extraordinary circumstances. 
Nevertheless, any ACO that exceeds 50% of the PSA threshold risks mandatory review, 
with a few exceptions.  These exceptions are as follows: first, rural providers who include 
only 1 physician group practice per specialty for each county that contains at leas t “isolated 
rural” zip code, and secondly dominant provider’s limitation, which encompasses ACO’s 
that exceeds 50% but there are no other ACO providers to compete with within the PSA.
69
 
On the other hand, there are ACOs on the spectrum that fall outside the safety zone 
but below the mandatory review levels of 50%.  The FTC developed a list identifying high 
market power behavior that would subject ACOs to particular level of scrutiny. ACOs can 
significantly avoid the likelihood of an investigation by: (1) forcing private payers (i.e., 
insurance companies) to purchase services exclusively from the ACO by restricting their 
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ability to steer patients to certain providers, such as providers outside the ACO; (2) tying 
sales of ACO services to sales of non-ACO services, such as requiring private payers to 
buy non-ACO services from an affiliate of an ACO participant as a condition of being able 
to buy ACO services; (3) requiring ACO participants to participate exclusively in the ACO 
(rather than having the ability to contract with insurance companies outside the ACO 
umbrella); and (4) telling insurance companies that they cannot distribute information 
about the ACO’s costs and quality of care to health plan enrollees.70 
The FTC and DOJ however, apply “rule of reason” analysis to any ACO 
participating in the MSSP because the agencies recognize that organizations meeting the 
MSSP eligibility requirements within a safety zone are likely to be bona fide arrangements 
intended to improve healthcare quality and costs through collaboration.
71
 Under the rule of 
reason analysis, anti-competitive effects of collective negotiations weigh against pro-
competitive efficiencies that result from concerted activities among provider network 
members (e.g., cost savings and quality improvement).
72
   Without a rule of reason 
analysis, collective negotiations and fee agreements are per se illegal under the antitrust 
laws.
73
 Furthermore, the rule of reason applies equally to joint ventures that accommodate 
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commercial payors, as long as provider maintains the requisite governance structure and 
clinical process similar to that employed in the MSSP. 
 
V. Dynamic Scenario 
Despite these safeguards provided by the Agencies, excessive market power remains 
obtainable by ACOs, and counteract the objective of market defragmentation  In 
encouraging participants to collaborate by incentivizing care providers to join forces, 
consolidation in the forms of mergers, joint ventures, and alliances undoubtedly exacerbate 
anti-competitive concerns. Furthermore, a substantial body of economic evidence indicates 
that market concentration has been a major factor spurring escalation in the cost of health 
insurance.
74
 Studies show that hospital consolidation in the 1990s raised overall inpatient 
prices by at least 5%, and by 40% or more when merging hospitals were located close to 
one another.
75
   
 ACOs ustilize a 3 year contract
76
, in which providers must abide by the regulations 
and performance measures set forth by the ACA and CMS, but the long term effects of 
ACOs are still unknown.  How much enforcement power will federal safe harbors have on 
ACO market dominance 10 years down the road?  The dynamic scenario analysis attempts 
to illustrate the effects changes in the environment will have on the model outcome.  Just 
as the potential exists for ACOs to naturally become anti-competitive,  the same potential 
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exists for  driving up prices and  lowering the quality of care as dominate providers that are 
per se anti-competitive or subject to mandatory FTC review. However, that antitrus t laws 
do not reach every corporation or entity that has attained a dominant position in the 
marketplace by simply being the best, or even just by being lucky.  Antitrust laws intend to 
promote and protect robust competition, not to punish big companies merely on account of 
their size, nor have antitrust laws ever been anti-market or anti-business in their underlying 
conception.
77
 Ultimately, antitrust issues occur and subsequently investigated when buyers 
or sellers, more so in the case of sellers than buyers, raise prices as a result of a merger in a 
narrowly defined market.
78
 In defining these relevant markets, the Agencies focus primarily 
on the alternatives available to consumers in the face of a decrease in the price paid by a 
hypothetical monopsonist.
79
 The commentary to the Horizontal Merger Guidelines 
specified horizontal mergers are likely to lessen competition substantially through 
coordinated interaction if it creates likelihood that, after the merger, competitors would 
coordinate their pricing or other competitive actions, or would coordinate them more 
completely or successfully than before the merger.
80
 
  An ACO achieves market dominance despite the FTC safe harbors in several 
scenarios.  The first scenario centers on the idea of natural competition,  an objective at the 
heart of PPACA and the objective in including ACOs in the passage of the Congressional 
Bill. Competition embodies the concept that poorly run companies are forced out of 
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business. The result of natural competition causes fixed cost of services to become so high 
that it is not profitable for a second firm to enter and compete.
81
  An established small-
scale organization or large-scale organization trying to break into the service area lacks 
efficiency and ultimately fails because competition has had an adverse effect.  The quality 
measures which PPACA wishes to impose on providers in order to facilitate transparency 
and promote integration contribute to this problem, having a negative effect on competition 
within a PSA.  The availability of information to the public regarding CMS quality 
measures, performance and other data potentially leads to patients choosing the higher 
quality ACO over the less prominent.  This possibility allows the dominant provider to 
raise prices and enforce bargaining power because that specific ACO knows individual 
patients will choose them over other less prominent ACOs.  
 A second scenario involves the concept of “Too big to fail.” ACOs concentrate more 
and more power in fewer organizations, allowing them to become “Too big to fail.”82 These 
large groups of providers classified as “too big to fail” will have increased leverage with 
payers; or, without effective competition, they receive little incentive to reduce spending or 
improve quality of care.
83
 Eligibility requirements suggest they favor larger more complex 
organizations and place a burden on small to mid-size practices. Groups of independent 
practitioners as well as other types of small and mid-sized practices may lack the 
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infrastructure, Internet technology, or other resources needed to qualify and succeed on 
their own. Also, smaller, entrepreneurial organizations that want to venture alone may find 
themselves competing against similar physicians’ practices that have joined ACOs or have 
been acquired by larger organizations and as a result, will be under less financial and 
clinical pressure to improve efficiency and quality than the smaller newcomer.
84
  
 
VI. Why Preemption is an inferior protection 
Although PPACA appears to achieve the benefits it has advanced for Medicare and 
its beneficiaries by means of vertical integration, it inevitably invites horizontal integration 
that creates new market power in private markets. ACOs, therefore, should be subject to 
close antitrust scrutiny.
85
 With these relaxed enforcement guidelines, including safety 
zones, the possibility of ACOs gaining exceptional market power could be apparent only 
several years after inception.  Are patients then left powerless, subject to the will of the 
provider and deprived of any remedy?  Opponents of state intervention support their 
position by the fact that states seldom bring anticompetitive actions and only rarely file 
consumer protection actions.
86
 In six of the seven service areas with a market concentration 
of health insurers, no significant consumer action was taken against health insurers.
87
 State 
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laws fail to rise to the level of substitutes for federal antitrust and consumer protection 
laws.
88
   
Congress, however, directly or indirectly addressed this concern when drafting the 
preemption laws of the ACA. HHS clarified that ACOs are not preempting any state laws 
or state law requirements and “to the extent that State law affects an ACO's operations, we 
expect the ACO to comply with those requirements as an entity authorized to conduct 
business in the State.  These preemption provisions set a federal floor under which state 
law cannot go.  “We do not believe it is necessary to make ACOs attest to do what they 
otherwise would be required to do under State law.”89  Hence, federal laws supercede state 
laws below the standards or which set lower standards than those established in PPACA. 
This drafting of the preemption clause allows the states’ laws to supplement, duplicate and 
even strengthen federal law to the States particular liking.
90
 State power, essentially, 
protects the rights of its patients and provides the overall best chance of success for ACOs 
within its borders. State enforcement plays an important role in improving the quality of 
health care services and lowering health care costs by encouraging integrated health care 
systems.
91
 
In addition to congressional intent, the Supreme Court held in Parker v. Brown, that 
states have the ability to grant immunity as a defense to parties in violation of federal 
antitrust claims as long as the parties are acting (1) pursuant to clear articulated and 
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affirmatively expressed state policy and (2) that the state is engaged in the active 
supervision of the conduct.
92
 If states have the ability to grant immunity, they likewise 
retain power to restrict conduct and impose more severe regulations that are required under 
the federal safe harbors. 
Private antitrust lawsuits and State antitrust claims provide a second level of 
protection against ACOs that can qualify for a safety zone and subject ACOs to a 
heightened level of scrutiny far more burdensome than federal law.  With regards to State 
lawsuits, State Attorney Generals (AG) bear the authority to enforce federal and state 
antitrust laws. State AGs have merger enforcement authority under their state antitrust 
statutes and under the Clayton Act.
93
 Typically, states investigating a matter arising under 
the federal antitrust laws jointly investigate with either the DOJ or the FTC, or they 
conduct a separate investigation.
94
  In addition, state attorneys general retain authority to 
seek restitution on behalf of the citizens of their states that have been harmed as a result of 
violations of either the federal or state antitrust laws. 
95
 State antitrust enforcement 
generally focuses on the interests of consumers and the proprietary interests of the states. 
Generally, state attorneys general possess the authority to protect the state’s consumers, the 
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state’s proprietary interests, and the general welfare and economy of the state. 96 The bulk 
of the State’s involvement deals with local price-fixing, price maintenance and mergers of 
entities dealing specifically with public establishments.
97
 The Supreme Court in California 
v. American Stores Co.
98
  and  lower federal courts in other cases, recognized that antitrust 
enforcement decisions by federal officials do not preclude state enforcers from taking a 
entirely different course of action.
99
 Professor Casalino, a strong proponent of ACOs, 
recommends the Agencies use antitrust regulations to weed out sham organizations , who 
are trying to obtain the benefits of MSSP without complying with CMS, or well-meaning 
incompetent organizations that are certain to fail. 
100
  
Over recent years, there have been several cases in which States took charge and 
filed antitrust claims, particularly in the context of healthcare mergers, despite the lack of 
federal involvement. One case in particular, California v. Sutter Health Care Sys., 
demonstrated a joint investigation between the FTC and State officials may arrive at 
completely different conclusions moving forth with the matter.
101
  The Attorney General 
decided to pursue the claim challenging hospital mergers and successfully did so.  
Similarly, in New York after investigation by the DOJ antitrust division produced no 
action, the State Attorney General successfully unwinded a price-fixing arrangement 
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between New York hospitals.
102
  As with the case of ACOs, federal antitrust authorities 
declined to take action in investigating and pursuing mergers of service providers who 
meet the MSSP criteria and fall within the safe harbors. 
 The ability for States to play a vital role in the antitrust enforcement shines through 
in the passage of past bills of legislation. In enacting the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act, which 
granted States the power to seek monetary relief as well as injunctive relief, congress 
envisioned that states would supplement federal antitrust efforts by tackling 
anticompetitive practices in areas the federal government had neither the resources nor the 
expertise to investigate. 
103
 The support of state involvement serves as recognition that the 
States have different levels of concern and focus than their federal counterparts.  Although 
consolidation of providers to form ACO in a specific rural region might not have an overall 
effect on the health care market at a federal level, individual citizens of a State might be 
burdened.  Without such action by the State Attorney Generals, ACOs retain excessive 
market power, creating hardships, and defeating the objectives of ACOs. Additionally state 
antitrust laws assist because the FTC and DOJ possess limited resources to investigate 
every formation of an ACO and determine if, despite falling in a safe harbor the ACO is 
still exhibiting pro-competitive effects. For example, if the FTC exhibits the 
competitiveness of large scale Hospitals (A) and (B), the FTC might decide that, based on 
constraints, it cannot look into the competitive restraints of smaller more local concerns.
104
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The DOJ or FTC might decide not to bring a challenge or a complaint because they deem 
the matter too local or otherwise small in scope to expend the federal government’s limited 
resources.
105
   
CONCLUSION 
ACOs possess the potential to remedy the problem of fragmentation within the 
United States health care system and reduce cost across the board for Medicare 
beneficiaries and private consumers alike.  However, these potential benefits carry with 
then the associated risk of ACOs obtaining excessive market power, despite potentially 
qualifying for a federal safe harbor.  Antitrust experts express a concern especially when 
pertaining to consolidation and pooling of funds and/or risks occurring on a horizontal 
level.  As this paper reflects, outcomes that might be efficient when ACOs are first 
established or during their first three years contract might not produce the desired result 
years down the road. This concern stands out in areas where there is only one provider for 
service a large area or in the case where one superior ACO surpasses all competitors , 
eligibility criteria identified by CMS, and becomes known as the provider everyone wants 
to use.  In either instance, the ACO retains the ability to negotiate substantial price 
increases, block competition and cause competitive harms that disrupt the benefits that 
PPACA can provide to the uninsured, underinsured and private consumers of the United 
States.  
Competition serves as the driving force of the marketplace and ensures consumers 
are adequately protected; health care markets are at their most efficient when competition 
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prevails.  State involvement assists in accomplishing a significant health care reform.  With 
no clear supremacy clause regarding state enforcement of antitrust laws, PPACA has 
provided an opportunity for States to strengthen antitrust protection against ACOs that 
might potential raise anticompetitive concerns.  In addition to the oversight of CMS, HHS 
and FTC, State enforcers continue to function as a legitimate second level of safeguard to 
give ACOs the best chance of success. Subjecting providers to stronger antitrust scrutiny 
and enforcement of fraud will provide a necessary check on the negative effects that could 
result from ACO formation years down the road.   
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